D. [23a] You need Scripture to exclude [the case of a bird] that was subjected to a carnal-act or that was used in an idolatrous ritual. You might have concluded that it makes sense to say this, since it is written, "Since there is a blemish in them, because of their mutilation, [they will not be accepted for you]" (Lev. 22:25).
E. And the House of R. Ishmael taught, "In every case where it is stated, `Mutilation' [from the root št translated in other uses as, `corruption'], it refers only to a carnal matter or to idolatry." [Mutilation refers to] a carnal matter as it is written, "[And God saw the earth, and behold, it was corrupt]; for all flesh had corrupted [hšyt] their way upon the earth" (Gen. 6:12). [And mutilation refers to] idolatry as it is written, "Beware lest you act corruptly [tšytwn] by making a graven image for yourselves, [in the form of any figure, the likeness of male or female]" (Deut. 4:16).
F. [You might have reasoned that a bird is not rendered unfit by a carnal act or by service to an idol as follows.] In every case that a blemish renders [an animal] unfit, [use of the animal for] a carnal matter or idolatry renders it unfit. And in every case that a blemish does not render [an animal] unfit, [use of the animal for] a carnal matter or idolatry does not render it unfit. And with regard to fowl [the other acts should not render them unfit] since a blemish does not render them unfit.
G. For the master said, "That it have no blemish and that it be masculine are [concerns relevant to a sacrifice] of a beast. But that it have no blemish and that it be masculine are not [concerns relevant to a sacrifice] of fowl." It would make sense to say that [use of a fowl for] a carnal matter or idolatry also does not render it unfit. It makes the point [through the verse, as explained at D, that such use does render them unfit].
I.3
A. R. Zira posed the question, "He who said, `I make a vow to bring a burnt-offering of a beast from a ram or a lamb,' and instead he brought a pallax [i.e., a sheep in its thirteenth month (Cashdan)], what is the law [i.e., does he fulfill his vow]?"
B. According to the view of R. Yohanan this should not be a question. For he said [concerning a pallax], "It is another category of creature [i.e., neither lamb nor ram and hence he does not fulfill his vow]."
C. As it was taught on Tannaite authority in the Mishnah, If he offered it [i.e., a pallax, to fulfill an obligation to bring a lamb or ram], he brings on its account the drink-offerings of a ram. But his sacrifice does not go to his credit [i.e., it does not serve to fulfill his obligation for his sacrifice] [M. Parah 1:3 U]. And said R. Yohanan, "[The word `or' in the verse], `Or for a ram, [you shall prepare for a cereal offering two tenths of an ephah of fine flour mixed with a third of a hin of oil]' (Num. 15:6), comes to include the pallax. [Rashi: If he held the view that it was a case of doubt, you would not need a special teaching to include it. Accordingly he must hold the view that it is another category of creature and the Torah provided an extra word as a means of including the pallax under the rule.]"
D. This should be a question according to the view of Bar Padda who said, [23b] "He must bring [the libations as if it were a ram] and make a conditional statement [Rashi: He says that if it is a ram then all of the libation serves this sacrifice. And if it is a lamb, then part of the libation serves the sacrifice and the remainder is a free-will-offering.]" [It must be then that the pallax is an animal whose status is in doubt, not another category of creature.]
E. Do we say that if [it is an animal about which we have a doubt whether it is] a ram or a lamb, then he must make a conditional statement [regarding the libation], but if it is another category of creature, then he need not make a conditional statement [regarding the libation]? Or do we say that if it is another category of creature, then too he must make a conditional statement [regarding the libation]? He should say then, "If this animal is another category of creature, let the entire libation be a free-will-offering." This question remains unresolved.
I.4
A. R. Zira posed the question, "He who says, `I take upon myself a vow to bring cakes of thanksgiving from either leaven or unleavened bread,' and he brought partially leavened bread [Ñy'wr], what is the rule?" [Does he fulfill his obligation? Or do we say that partially leavened bread is in a category of its own?]
B. [When we speak of] partially leavened bread, according to whose view [do we speak]? [See b. Pes. 48b.] If we speak of partially leavened bread according to the view of R. Meir, then according to the view of R. Judah this is perfectly good unleavened bread. If [we speak of partially leavened bread] according to the view of R. Judah, then according to the view of R. Meir this is perfectly good leavened bread. And if [we speak of partially leavened bread] according to the view of R. Meir, then [even] according to the view of R. Meir since [if he eats it on Passover] he is given lashes for eating it, it is [therefore clear that it is] deemed to be leavened bread!
C. Rather it must be [that we speak of partially leavened bread] according to the view of R. Judah, and according to the view of R. Judah what is the rule? Is it a matter of doubt [as to the definition of the bread] and he fulfills his obligation? Or do we say that it is in a category of its own and he does not fulfill his obligation?
D. But lo, said R. Huna, "He who says, `I take upon myself a vow to bring loaves of thank-offering,' he must bring a thank-offering and its loaves." And because he is obligated to bring a thank-offering and its loaves [and both unleavened and leavened loaves must be brought], lo this person does not know if they are the leavened loaves and he now must bring the unleavened loaves, or if they are the unleavened loaves and he now must bring the leavened loaves.
E. It is not necessary [to resolve this question because the circumstances of the case are different]. For he said, "I take upon myself the obligation to bring loaves in order to fulfill the obligation of the loaves for the thank-offering of so-and-so [and he brought partially leavened loaves]." But in the end that person will not know if they are the leavened loaves and he now must bring the unleavened loaves, or if they are the unleavened loaves and he now must bring the leavened loaves.
F. It is not necessary [to resolve this question either because the circumstances are] that he did not say [about the loaves he brought for his fellow], `I do this to free him [of his obligation to bring the loaves of his thank-offering. Rather these are in addition to the loaves that his fellow must bring.]. Is this person [who vowed to bring ten loaves more] then freed from his obligation or not [by bringing partially leavened loaves]? The question remains unresolved.
1:6 A-B
A. What is valid [as a mode of killing] in the case of the [red] cow is invalid in the case of the calf [whose neck is to be broken].
B. What is valid in the case of the calf is invalid in the case of the cow.
I.1
A. Our rabbis taught on Tannaite authority: A [red] cow killed by slaughtering is valid; killed by breaking the neck is invalid. A calf killed by breaking the neck is valid; killed by slaughtering is invalid. We find that, What is valid [as a mode of killing] in the case of the [red] cow is invalid in the case of the calf [whose neck is to be broken]. What is valid in the case of the calf is invalid in the case of the cow.
B. And should not a [red] cow be valid if killed by breaking its neck based on the logic of qal wahomer: what is the case regarding a calf? It is not rendered valid through slaughter, but is rendered valid through breaking its neck. For a [red] cow that is rendered valid through slaughter, is it not logical to deduce that it should be rendered valid through breaking the neck?
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